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THE NATIONALIZATION OF HEALTH INFORMATION 
PRIVACY PROTECTIONS 
Lawrence O. Gostin, James G. Hodge, Jr., and Lauren Marks 
I. INTRODUCTION 
On April 14,2001, President George W Bush approved the Standards for 
Privacy of Individually Identifiable Health Information.! These regulations, 
which represent the first systematic national privacy protections of health 
information,2 flow from a congressional mandate in the Health Insurance 
Portability and Accountability Act of 1996.3 HIPAA requires the implemen-
tation of health information privacy protections, either through federal leg-
1. Hereinafter health data privacy regulations. 
2. See Press Release, President George W. Bush, Statement by the President (Apr. 12, 
200 I), at http://www.whitehouse.gov/newsireleasesl2001l0412001 0412-1.html [hereinafter 
Bush Press Release]; Press Release, Secretary Tommy G. Thompson, Statement by HHS 
Secretary Tommy G. Thompson Regarding the Patient Privacy Rule (Apr. 12,200 I), available 
at http://www.hhs.gov/news/press/200 1 pres1200 1 0412.html [hereinafter Thompson Press 
Release]. 
3. Pub. L. No. 104-191, 110 Stat. 1936; [hereinafter HIPAA]. 
Lawrence O. Gostin is Professor of Law, Georgetown University Law Center; Professor, 
Johns Hopkins Bloomberg School of Public Health; Director, Center for Law and the 
Public's Health at Georgetown and Johns Hopkins Universities; and Visiting Fellow, Cen-
tre for Socio-Legal Studies, Oxford University. James G. Hodge, Jr., is Adjunct Professor 
of Law, Georgetown University Law Center; Scientist, Johns Hopkins Bloomberg School 
of Public Health; and Project Director, Center for Law and the Public's Health at George-
town and Johns Hopkins Universities. Lauren Marks will receive her J.D. in May 2003 
from Georgetown University Law Center and is a research assistant at the Center for Law 
and the Public's Health at Georgetown and Johns Hopkins Universities. 
This article is based substantially on the following works published and submitted pre-
viously. Lawrence O. Gostin, National Health Information Privacy: Regulations Under 
the Health Insurance Portability and Accountability Act, 285 JAMA 3015 (2001); Law-
rence O. Gostin, James G. Hodge, Jr., & Mira S. Burghardt, Balancing Communal 
Goods and Personal Privacy Under a National Health Informational Privacy Rule, 46 
ST. LOUIS. u. L.J. 5 (2002); Lawrence O. Gostin & James G. Hodge, Jr., Personal 
Privacy and Common Goods: A Framework for Balancing Under the National Health 
Information Privacy Rule, MINN. L. REv. (forthcoming 2002). 
1113 
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islation or administrative regulation, by the Department of Health and Hu-
man Services.4 These health data privacy regulations protect the privacy of 
individually identifiable health records in any form (e.g., electronic, paper, 
oral) by limiting disclosure and use, regulating privacy and security policies, 
and implementing fair information practices. The provisions apply to "cov-
ered entities," including health providers, health insurance plans, and health 
care clearinghouses, as well as their business associates. 
There are two primary justifications for safeguarding health information 
privacy: (1) the personal nature of health data and (2) the rapid shift from 
paper to electronic records. Health information used by health providers, 
insurers, and data processors can include intimate details about the pa-
tient's mental and physical health as well as information about the patient's 
social behaviors, personal relationships, and financial status.S Unwarranted 
disclosures of this information could lead to societal stigmatization and 
discrimination by employers, insurers, and others, as well as a loss of patient 
trust in medical providers.6 
Privacy concerns have been compounded by the proliferation of and 
access to health records resulting from the shift to electronic medical rec-
ord keeping within the national health information infrastructure. Health 
information is increasingly accessed, used, disclosed, and stored in elec-
tronic format. This does not necessarily mean that health data are less 
secure, as electronic systems are in many ways. safer than manual systems. 
Nevertheless, electronic data can be accessed in greater quantities and ma-
nipulated in ways that are virtually impossible for manual systems. Thus, 
while significant benefits may flow from the electronic health information 
infrastructure, the potential to disclose or reveal sensitive health data has 
raised individual fears of privacy violations.? In one recent survey, more 
than 80 percent of the public respondents felt that they had "lost all control 
over their personal information."s 
The new HIPAA regulations provide the most comprehensive national 
protection of health information. VV"hile most states have privacy safe-
guards, they are so variable and incoherent that they are widely regarded 
as inadequate. Congress's grant of authority to HHS to develop privacy 
4. Hereinafter HHS. 
5. See Lawrence O. Gostin, Health Information Privary, 80 CORNELL L. REV. 451, 489-90 
(1995). 
6. See id. at 490-91. 
7. See California HealthCare Foundation, Americans Worry About the Privary of Their Com-
puterized Medical Records Oan. 29, 1999), at http://www.chcf.org/press/ view.cfm?itemID = 
12267. 
8. Harris Equifax, Health Information Privary (1993), available at http://www.epic.org/ 
privacy/medicaVpolls.html. 
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regulations offered the promise of a comprehensive solution to the con-
cerns of consumers and privacy advocates. Through the regulations, HHS 
attempts to protect individual privacy while recognizing legitimate needs 
for such data to process health claims and deliver medical care, as well as 
to provide for communal goods (e.g., public health and health research). 
Specifically, the regulations implement fair information practices, which 
have long been a feature of existing federallaws.9 Fair information practices 
allow patients to: (1) inspect and amend their records; (2) be notified of 
covered entities' privacy practices and potential uses and disclosures of 
health information; and (3) request confidential communications and an 
account of actual disclosures. The regulations also endeavor to protect 
patient privacy by limiting uses and disclosures of individually identifiable 
medical information or "protected health information."10 
Disclosure and use of PHI can only occur with patient consent, subject 
to several exceptions, including: (1) law enforcement: law enforcement of-
ficials may receive information from covered entities without consent pur-
suant to a court order, subpoena, or other legal order; (2) judicial and ad-
ministrative proceedings: a covered entity may disclose PHI in a judicial or 
administrative proceeding without the individual's consent in response to 
a court order or administrative tribunal or in certain 'circumstances, in 
response to a subpoena or discovery request; (3) parents of unemancipated 
minors: parents are recognized as personal representatives of unemanci-
pated minors; while the current rule restricts parents' access to the child's 
medical record, the Bush administration is likely to relax those limita-
tions; 11 (4) "significant others, "includingfamily members,jriends, and caretakers 
of adults and emancipated minors: covered entities may disclose limited health 
information of an adult or emancipated minor without consent to a relative, 
personal friend, or designated person in the case of an emergency or in the 
course of the significant other's basic care-taking duties; (5) public health: 
PHI can be disclosed for numerous public health purposes without con-
sent, including: (a) to prevent or control disease, injury, or disability; (b) to 
report child abuse or neglect; (c) to report relevant information to the Food 
and Drug Administration; and (d) to report to an employer conducting 
medical surveillance in the workplace if the employee is notified; (6) health 
research: a covered entity can use or disclose individually identifiable health 
information for research without consent if it obtains a waiver from an 
Institutional Review Board ll or a privacy board; and (7) commercial mar-
keting: covered entities may use or disclose personal health information for 
9. See infra Part III.C. 
10. Hereinafter PHI. 
11. See Thompson Press Release, supra note 2, 'II 10. 
12. Hereinafter IRB. 
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face-to-face commercial marketing to individuals or for the marketing of 
products and services of nominal value. 
To be effective, a comprehensive, national health information privacy 
policy should balance individual interests in protecting the privacy ofhealth 
data with societal needs to share the data for communal purposes. I3 How-
ever, many of these provisions leave significant gaps in privacy protection. 
HHS admits that the regulation only sets a "floor" of protection that "bal-
ance[s] the needs of the individual with the needs of society."14 At times, 
the regulation makes inappropriate trade-offs between the public welfare 
and individual privacy that may either fail: (1) to protect individual privacy 
or (2) to accomplish significant communal benefits (e.g., public health, 
health research). 
In Part II, this article examines the justifications for implementing com-
prehensive national health information privacy regulations, including the 
personal nature of health information and the increasing threats to personal 
privacy from the shift to an electronic health information infrastructure. 
In doing so, it looks at historical attempts by federal and state officials to 
regulate the use and disclosure of personal health information, and con-
cludes that prior standards have been largely inadequate. In Part III, this 
article explains tHe new national health information privacy regulations: 
(1) what do they cover?; (2) to whom do they apply?; (3) how do they 
safeguard personal privacy through notice and security provisions?; and 
(4) do they preempt existing legal privacy protections? 
Part IV of this article examines two autonomy rules established in the 
national privacy rule: "informed consent" (for uses or disclosures of iden-
tifiable health data for health care-related purposes) and "written author-
ization" (for uses or disclosures of health data for nonhealth care-related 
purposes). The article observes that the informed consent rule is neither 
"informed" nor "consensual." The rule is thus likely to thwart the effective 
administration of health organizations without benefiting individuals. Re-
quiring written authorization, on the other hand, protects individual pri-
vacy to prevent disclosure of information to entities that do not perform 
health-related functions, such as employers and life insurers. Lastly, this 
article also examines various contexts in which data can be shared for public 
purposes under the national privacy rule: to law enforcement officials; for 
judicial and administrative proceedings; to parents of unemancipated mi-
nors; to "significant others"; to public health authorities; for health re-
search; and for commercial marketing. 
13. Donna E. Shalala, Health Care Information and Privacy, 8 HEALTH MATRIX 223, 231 
(1998). 
14. See Standards for Privacy of Individually Identifiable Health Information, 65 Fed. Reg. 
82,463 (Dec. 28, 2000), available at http://aspe.hhs.gov. 
o 
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II. PERSONAL PRIVACY IN THE ELECTRONIC HEALTH 
INFORMATION INFRASTRUCTURE 
A. Electronic Health Data 
Protecting the privacy of identifiable health infonnation was one of Con-
gress's key priorities in enacting HIPAA. Congress desired better privacy 
protections because of its concern over the proliferation of electronic 
health infonnation. During the mid-1980s, fundamental shifts in the or-
ganization, delivery, and financing of health care services led to the devel-
opment of more sophisticated health information systems. IS Individual pa-
tient medical records are increasingly stored in electronic databases by the 
government and private medical providers. The goal of HIPAA, as ex-
pressed by the Institute of Medicine and others, was that patient medical 
records should be recorded in every health care setting so they could be 
accessed widely among health care professionals. 16 These changes are 
transforming the ways in which health infonnation is acquired, used, dis-
closed, and stored in the modern health care system. 
There are many advantages to the systemic collection and use of elec-
tronic health data. More accurate and accessible data allow consumers to 
make more informed decisions about their individual health care needs, 
including health plans, providers, diagnoses, products, and treatments. 
Clinical care is improved through faster and more accurate diagnoses,17 
increased checks on medical procedures, I B prevention of adverse drug 
events,19 and the dissemination of expert medical information in areas tra-
ditionally underserved through telemedicine and other techniques. Public 
health surveillance of injuries and diseases in the population is facilitated.20 
Medical research on the causes of injuries and disease and health services 
research concerning the quality and cost effectiveness of health care ser-
vices are improved through increased access to (and more accurate) infor-
15. See COMM. ON MAINTAINING PRIVACY & SEC. IN HEALTH CARE APPLICATIONS FOR THE 
NAT'L INFO. INFRASTRUCTURE, NAT'L RESEARCH COUNCIL, FOR THE RECORD: PROTECTING 
ELECTRONIC HEALTH INFORMATION 21-22 (1997); Lawrence O. Gostin, Personal Privacy in 
the Health Care System: Employer-Sponsored Insurance, Managed Care, and Integrated Delivery 
Systems, 7 KENNEDY INST. ETHICS]. 361, 364 (1997). 
16. See Gostin, supra note 5, at 452. 
17. See Dereck L. Hunt et aI., Effects of Computer-Based Clinical Decision Support Systems on 
Physician Peiformance and Patient Outcomes, 280 JAMA 1339, 1344 (1998). 
18. See David W. Bates et aI., Effect of Computerized Physician Order Entry and a Team 
Intervention on Prevention of SeriollS M,dication Errors, 280 JAMA 1311, 1316 (1998). 
19. See Robert A. Raschke et a!', A Computer Alert System to Prevent Injury from Adverse 
Drug Events, 280 JAMA 1317 (1998). 
20. See Lawrence O. Glstin et a!', The Public Health Information Infrastructure, 275 JAMA 
1921, 1921 (1996); John M. Last, Epidemiology and Ethics, 19 LAW, MED. & HEALTH CARE 166 
(1991); William L. Roper et aI., Effectiveness in Health Care: An Initiative to Evaluate and 
Improve Medical Practice, 319 NEW ENG.]' MED. 1197 (1988); see also Antoine Flahault et aI., 
FluNet as a Tool for Global Monitoring of Influenza 011 the Web, 280 JAMA 1330 (1998). 
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mation. Electronic security tools, including personal access codes, encryp-
tion programs,21 and audit trials,22 can more efficiently monitor health care 
fraud and abuse23 and protect data from unauthorized uses and disclosures. 
Along with these benefits, however, come significant costs. The com-
puterization of health data raises significant privacy concerns. Health care 
data concerning individuals are among the most sensitive types of personal 
information. These records contain large amounts of personal information 
that can be used to create a profile of an individual, including: (1) demo-
graphic information, such as age, sex, race, marital status, children, and 
occupation; (2) financial information, such as employment status, income, 
and methods of payment; (3) medical information about diagnoses, treat-
ments, disabilities, end-of-life decisions, and disease histories of the indi-
vidual and family members; (4) genomic information such as diagnostic 
tests for carrier traits and genetically related diseases; (5) personal identi-
fiers other than name, including Social Security number, addresses, and 
phone numbers; and (6) information about why treatment is sought, such 
as being the victim of a violent crime, firearm injury, or the at-fault party 
in an auto accident.24 
In a society that strongly values individual autonomy and decision mak-
ing,25 protecting the privacy of personally identifiable health data is criti-
cai.26 Insufficient protection of health care information can lead to unau-
thorized disclosures, which in turn may subject individuals to social stigma 
and discrimination by insurance companies, health care professionals and 
institutions, and employers.27 Patients have a reasonable expectation of pri-
vacy in their personal affairs provided that the exercise of these interests 
does not harm others.2S Respecting personal privacy requires that individ-
uals maintain some degree of control over their personal information. In 
addition, protecting the privacy of individually identifiable health infor-
mation is important to achieving benefits for the population, such as public 
21. See Elizabeth Corcoran, Breakthrough Possible in Battle over Encryption Technology, WASH. 
PoST, July 12, 1998, at A8. 
22. See NAT'L RESEARCH COUNCIL, COMPUTERS AT RISK: SAFE COMPUTING IN THE INFOR-
MATION AGE 88 (1990). 
23. See Gostin, supra note 5, at 481. 
24. See Lawrence O. Gostin, Health Care Information and the Protettion of Personal Privacy: 
Ethical and Legal Considerations, 127 ANNALS OF INTERNAL MED. 683, 684 (1997). 
25. See generally ALAN WESTIN ET AL., THE EQUIFAX REPORT ON CONSUMERS IN THE INFOR-
MATION AGE (1990). 
26. See Paul Starr, Health and the Right to Privacy, 2) AM.).L. & MED. 193 (1999). 
27. See, e.g., Lawrence O. Gostin & James G. Hodge, Jr., The "Names Debate": The Case 
for National HIV Reporting in the United States, 61 ALB. L. REv. 679, 724 (1998); Madison 
Powers, Privacy and the Control of Genetic Information, in THE GENETIC FRONTIER: ETHICS, LAW 
AND POLICY 77 (Mark S. Frankel & Albert H. Teich eds., 1994). 
28. See TOM L. BEAUCHAMP & JAMES F. CHILDRESS, PRINCIPLES OF BIOMEDICAL ETHICS 126, 
406-412 (4th ed. 1994). 
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health surveillance and longitudinal health research. As we (and others) 
have stated, protecting health information privacy (e.g., by providing individ-
uals some control over their health data without severely restricting war-
ranted uses of the data) directly improves the quality of health care and public 
health data (e.g., by encouraging individuals to fully utilize health services 
and cooperate with health agencies).29 
B. Existing Legal Protections 
Safeguarding personal privacy through legal mechanisms allows for the 
creation of standards that are enforceable through courts and administra-
tive bodies. Legal safeguards may be expressed through federal or state 
constitutional protections of health information privacy, case law, or leg-
islative and administrative law. Despite the potential of the law to protect 
privacy, existing safeguards are inadequate, fragmented, and inconsistent. 
There exist major gaps in legal protection of health privacy as well as sig-
nificant theoretical problems with the structure of privacy protections. 
1. Constitutional Right to Privacy 
Apart from the Fourth Amendment, the U.S. Supreme Court has not ar-
ticulated a clear, strong standard for a constitutional right to informational 
privacy.30 Judicial recognition of a constitutional right to informational pri-
vacy is particularly important because the government is a primary collec-
tor and disseminator of health information. A constitutional right could 
shield individuals from unauthorized government acquisition or disclosure 
of personal information. 
The U.S. Constitution does not expressly provide a right to informa-
tional privacy.31 The judiciary, however, has recognized a limited right to 
informational privacy as a liberty interest under the substantive Due Pro-
cess Clauses of the Fifth and Fourteenth Amendments. In Whalen v. Roe,32 
the U.S. Supreme Court examined whether the constitutional right to pri-
vacy encompasses the collection, storage, and dissemination of health in-
formation in government data banks (specifically, a New York public health 
database containing pharmaceutical records). Although the Court acknowl-
edged a "threat to privacy implicit in the accumulation of vast amounts of 
personal information in computerized data banks or other massive govern-
29. James G. Hodge,Jr., Lawrence O. Gostin, & Peter D.Jacobson, LegalIssues Concerning 
the Privacy of Electronic Health Information, 282 JAMA 1466, 1470 (1999). 
30. See, e.g., Seth F. Kreimer, Sunlight, Secrets, and Scarlet Letters: The Tension Between Pri-
vacy and Disclosure in Constitutional Law, 140 U. PA. L. REv. 1 (1991); Richard C. Turkington, 
Legacy of the Warren and Brandeis Article: The Emerging Unencumbered Constitutional Right to 
Informational Privacy, 10 N. ILL. U. L. REv. 479 (1990); Francis S. Chlapowski, Note, The 
Constitutional Protection of Informational Privacy, 71 B.U. L. REv. 133 (1991). 
31. See Gostin, supra note 5, at 495-98. 
32. 429 U.S. 589 (1977); see also Nixon v. Gen. Servo Admin., 433 U.S. 425 (1977). 
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ment files,"H it failed to tailor a constitutional remedy to meet this threat. 
Justice Stevens, writing for a unanimous Court, simply recognized that "in 
some circumstances" the duty to avoid unwarranted disclosures "arguably 
has its roots in the Constitution."34 Provided that the state had adequate 
standards and procedures for protecting the privacy of sensitive medical 
information, the Court found no privacy violation. 35 Whalen has been sub-
sequently interpreted as affording a tightly circumscribed right to infor-
mational privacy. 
In general, courts have employed a flexible test balancing the govern-
ment invasion of the individual's privacy against the strength of the gov-
ernment interest.36 Where the government can articulate a valid societal 
purpose and employs reasonable security measures, traditional govern-
mental activities of information collection do not infringe an individual's 
constitutional informational privacy rights. Any right to privacy under the 
federal or state constitutions37 is, of course, limited to government action. 
Thus, collection and use of health data by private or quasi-private health 
data organizations, health plans, researchers, and insurers are constitu-
tionally unprotected. 
2. Common Law Protections 
Most states recognize, via common and statutory law, the legal duties of 
confidentiality of certain health care professionals (e.g., physicians, nurses, 
lab technicians) not to disclose health information. Yet, these duties are 
not absolute. Disclosures without individual consent may lawfully be made 
to: (1) protect third parties from identifiable harm, (2) report information 
for public health purposes as required by state law, or (3) notify in some 
cases of medical emergency. Unwarranted disclosures, however, may sub-
ject responsible parties to civilliability.J8 
33. Whalen, 429 U.S. at 605. 
34.Id. 
35. !d. 
36. See United States v. Westinghouse Elec. Corp., 638 F.2d 570, 578 (3d Cir. 1980) (hold-
ing that the National Institute of Occupational Safety and Health was entitled to receive the 
medical records of private employees exposed to toxic substance, subject to their informed 
consent). The coun enunciated five factors to be balanced in determining me scope of me 
constitutional right to informational privacy: (1) me type of record and me information it 
contains, (2) me potential for harm in any unaumorized disclosure, (3) me injury from dis-
closure to me relationship in which me record was generated, (4) me adequacy of safeguards 
to prevent nonconsensual disclosure, and (5) me degree of need for access, i.e., a recognizable 
public interest. !d. at 578. 
37. See, e.g., Rasmussen v. S. Fla. Blood Serv., Inc., 500 So. 2d 533 (Fla. 1987). "Since me 
1970's, more man a dozen states have adopted constitutional amendments designed to protect 
a variety of privacy interests, including limitations on access to personal information." Gostin, 
supra note 5, at 498. 
38. See, e.g., McCormick v. Eng., 494 S.E.2d 431 (S.c. Ct. App. 1997); Gostin, supra note 
5, at 508-II; Lawrence O. Gostin & James G. Hodge, Jr., Genetic Privacy and the Law: An 
End to Genetics Exceptionalism, 40 JURI METRICS 21, 46 (1999). 
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Although a traditional construct of privacy protections and a forerunner 
of modern privacy theory, the duty of confidentiality is antiquated. Con-
fidentiality is predicated on the existence of a physician/patient relation-
ship. Modern data collection is based only in small part on this relationship. 
Health records contain a substantial amount of information gathered from 
numerous primary and secondary sources: laboratories, pharmacies, 
schools, public health officials, researchers, insurers, and other individuals 
and institutions. Paper or electronic patient health records are kept by 
government agencies, regional health database organizations, and infor-
mation brokers. The duty of confidentiality arising at the point of clinical 
care or research simply does not protect the patient from disclosure by 
these secondary sources of data. 
3. Existing Legislative and Administrative Protections 
Federal and state legislatures and executive agencies have enacted and con-
sidered a growing number of statutes and regulations to protect privacy.39 
The federal government has previously enacted several statutes and regu-
lations to protect privacy of health information. The Privacy Act of 197440 
requires federal agencies to utilize fair information practices regarding the 
collection, use, or dissemination of systematized records, including health 
data. The Freedom of Information Act of 196641 exempts personally iden-
tifiable health information from public dissemination by the federal govern-
ment. Other federal regulations protect health information privacy relating 
to the treatment of persons for drug or alcohol dependency in federally 
funded facilities,42 and the administration of human subject research.43 
Most states have passed privacy statutes that mimic the federal Privacy Act44 
and FOrA, 45 both of which apply to state collections of data. A few states have 
enacted comprehensive medical information privacy acts.46 These laws pro-
vide broad protections of health information acquired, collected, used, or dis-
closed within the state. States have also passed disease-specific privacy laws 
that set forth stringent privacy and security protections for certain types of 
information, including medical information concerning one's mv status47 
39. See Gostin, supra note 5, at 499-508. 
40. 5 U.S.c. § 552(b)(1)-(3), (6) (2000). 
41. 5 U.S.c. § 552 (2000); hereinafter FOIA. 
42. 42 U.S.c. § 290dd-2 (Supp. V 1994). 
43. 45 C.ER. §§ 46.101 to .404 (2001). 
44. See, e.g., N.Y. PUB. OFF. LAW §§ 91-99 (McKinney 1988 & Supp. 1995). 
45. See, e.g., MISS. CODE ANN. §§ 25-61-1 to -3, -5, -7, -9 to -11, -13, -15, -17 
(1991). 
46. See, e.g., CAL. Cm CODE §§ 56-56.37 (West 1982 & Supp. 1995); WASH. REv. CODE 
ANN. §§ 70.02.005 to .904 (West 1992 & Supp. 1996). 
47. See Harold Edgar & Hazel Sandomire, Medical Privacy Issues in the Age of AIDS: Leg-
HeinOnline -- 37 Tort & Ins. L.J. 1122 2001-2002
1122 Tort & Insurance Law Journal, Volume 37, Number 4, Summer 2002 
or other communicable diseases,48 genetic information,49 information util-
ized in medical research (such as state cancer registries), or public health 
information. 50 
Although existing federal and state privacy statutes and regulations are 
meaningful and serve valuable ends, they share several weaknesses: (1) like 
constitutional privacy protections, most statutes apply primarily to govern-
ment collections, uses, or disclosures of health information, and thus often 
do not confer protections to health information in the private sector; 
(2) they fail to address the new challenges to individual privacy arising 
from the automation of medical records; (3) they collectively represent a 
patchwork effort to address the privacy and security of specific health in-
formation; (4) some kinds of data are treated as superconfidential (e.g., 
HIV/AIDS), while other data are virtually unprotected, leading to incon-
sistencies and unfairness; (5) they do not effectively balance competing 
individual interests in privacy with the need to use the data for the common 
good; and (6) some state laws prohibit disclosures without informed con-
sent, but make so many exceptions as to negate the prohibition. 
These weaknesses in existing law suggest the need for a comprehensive 
approach to privacy protection. The health data privacy regulations pro-
vide a national standard to protect health data. However, like existing pri-
vacy laws, the regulations may inadequately protect individual privacy and 
also fail to assure that data are shared where necessary to protect the 
public's welfare. 
III. HEALTH INFORMATION PRIVACY PROTECTIONS UNDER 
THE NATIONAL REGULATIONS 
The creation of national health information privacy regulations might 
seem uncontroversial in light of existing public apprehensions to disclo-
sure, current gaps in legal protections, and Congress's commitment to bet-
ter protect such data. However, the health privacy rule was established only 
after years of struggle and efforts in the legislative and executive branches. 
Under HIPAA, Congress created a self-imposed deadline of August 21, 
1999, to pass health information privacy legislation.51 As a result of interest 
group lobbying, 52 a diverse health law and policy agenda, and politics, Con-
islative Options, 16 AM. J.L. & MED. 155 (1990) (examining state legislation dealing with HIV-
related problems in medical privacy laws). 
48. See Lawrence O. Gostin, The Future of Public Health Law, 12 AM. J.L. & MED. 461, 
463 -65 (1986). 
49. See, e.g., Gostin & Hodge, mpra note 38, at 47-53. 
50. See Gostin, mpra note 20, at 1922. 
51. § 264(c)(I), 110 Stat. 1936,2033 (1996). 
52. See Amy Goldstein & Robert O'Harrow, Bush Will Proceed on Patient Privacy, WASH. 
POST, Apr. 13,2001, at AI, AIO. This lobbying is nothing new; a 1998 Center for Public 
Integrity report found that "time and time again ... Congress has put big money corporate 
interests ahead of the basic privacy interests of the American people." CTR. FOR PUB. INTEG-
RITY, NOTHING SACRED: THE POLITICS OF PRIVACY 5 (1998). 
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gress failed to pass comprehensive privacy laws by the deadline.53 HIPAA 
authorized the Secretary of HHS to issue privacy regulations if Congress 
failed to act. 54 The initial publication, HHS's proposed regulations in No-. 
vember 1999,55 garnered over 52,000 public comments. 56 The final rule 
was promulgated in December 2000, at the end of President Clinton's 
term.57 Reflecting President Bush's promise to reassess regulations enacted 
late in his predecessor's term,58 the comment period was reopened and 
HHS received several thousand additional comments. 59 Although privacy 
advocates were concerned that the Bush administration would scale back 
or eliminate the rules altogether,60 HHS announced on April 12 , 2001, that 
the final regulations as previously constructed would go forward, subject 
to interpretive guidelines developed by HHS.61 The first of these guide-
lines was released in July 2001.62 The regulations take effect for most cov-
ered entities on April 12, 2003, and one year later for small health plans. 
Although their development was convoluted, the health data privacy reg-
ulations attempt to establish a national baseline of health information privacy 
protection,63 although individual privacy is both under- and overprotected. 
A. The Scope of the Standard 
At least two questions are important in the development of national health 
information privacy regulation: (1) what information should be protected, 
53. See Goldstein & O'Harrow, supra note 52, at AI0; Bush Press Release, supra note 2; 
Dep't of Health & Human Servs., HHS Fact Sheet: Protecting the Privacy of Patients' Health 
Information (May 9,2001), at http://aspe.hhs.gov/admnsimp/finallpvcfact2.htm. 
54. § 264(c)(I), 110 Stat. 1936, 2033 (1996). 
55. Standards for Privacy of Individually Identifiable Health Information, 64 Fed. Reg. 
59,918-60,065 (Nov 3, 1999). 
56. See Peter A. Setness, HIPAA and the Changing Face of Patient Privacy, 111 POSTGRADUATE 
MED. (2002), available at http://www.postgradmed.comlissues/2002/01_02leditorialjan.htm. 
'113. 
57. Standards for Privacy of Individually Identifiable Health Information, 65 Fed. Reg. 
82,462 (2001). 
58. See Robert Pear, Bush Accepts Rules to Protect Privacy of Medical Information, N.Y. TiMES, 
Apr. 13,2001, at AI. 
59. See Thompson Press Release, supra note 2; HHS Fact Sheet, supra note 53. 
60. See INST. FOR HEALTHCARE RESEARCH & POLICY, HEALTH PRIVACY PROJECT 2-3 (2001), 
at http://www.healthprivacy.org/ usr_docl55009.pdf [hereinafter HEALTH PRIVACY PROJECT]; 
see also Goldstein & O'Harrow, supra note 52, at AI0; Robert Pear, White House Plans to Revise 
New Medical Privacy Rules, N.Y. TiMES, Apr. 8, 2001, at 22. 
61. Thompson Press Release, supra note 2; see also Goldstein & O'Harrow, supra note 52, 
at AI, AlO; Robert Pear, Administration Clarifies New u.s. Rules Guarding Privacy of Patients, 
N.Y. TiMES, July 7, 2001, at AI. 
62. Office for Civil Rights, Dep't of Health & Human Servs., Standards fur Privacy of 
Individually Identifiable Health Information, at http://aspe.hhs.gov/admnsimp/finallpvcguidel. 
htm [hereinafter HHS, Standards]; see Ceci Connelly, Guidelines on Patient Privacy Rules Issued, 
WASH. POST, July 7,2001, at A6; Pear, supra note 58, at A9. 
63. To enforce these protections, Secretary Thompson can investigate complaints and con-
duct compliance reviews. Standards for Privacy of Individually Identifiable Health Informa-
tion, 45 c.F.R. §§ 160.306, 308 (2001). Violations of the standard can lead to civil and criminal 
penalties of up to $250,000 and ten years in prison. See HHS Fact Sheet, supra note 53. There 
is no private right of action for individuals to redress violations. 
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and (2) from whose actions should the information be protected? These 
questions are partially answered by the limits of HHS's authority under 
HIPAA.64 
What Information Is Protected? The regulations explicitly cover health in-
formation65 that is individually identifiable.66 Individually identifiable health 
information includes any data that contain unique identifiable characteristics, 
including a name, Social Security or driver's license number, fingerprint, or 
genetic linkP Where health data are truly nonidentifiable (e.g., aggregate 
statistical data, nonlinked data, or other data stripped of all individual iden-
tifiers), privacy interests are minimal. Consequently, the national privacy 
rules do not restrict access, use, or disclosure of nonidentifiable data.68 HHS 
permits covered entities to assign codes69 to allow for later re-identification, 
but requires steps to prevent harmful identificationsJo 
64. For a discussion on the constitutional issues raised by the jurisdictional concerns, see 
A. Craig Eddy, A Critical Analysis of Health and Human Services' Proposed Health Privacy Reg-
ulations in Light of The Health Insurance Privacy [sic] and Accountabilicy Act of 1996, 9 ANNALS 
HEALTH L. 1, 50-60 (2000). 
65. Health information is comprehensively defined as data (1) "created or received by a 
health care provider, health plan, public health authority, employer, life insurer, school or 
university, or health care clearinghouse," and (2) "relat[ed] to the past, present, or future 
physical or mental health or condition of an individual, the provision of health care to an 
individual, or the past, present, or future payment for the provision of health care to an 
individual." 45 c.F.R. § 160.103 (defining "health information"). 
66. !d. § 164.514. HHS defines individually identifiable health information as health in-
formation that "identifies an individual ... or with respect to which there is a reasonable basis 
to believe the information can be used to identify the individual." Id. § 164.501. The regu-
latory definition limits the term to only a subset of health information, specifically information 
created or received by health care providers, health plans, employers, or health care clear-
inghouses. Id. 
67. The health data privacy rule outlines two means for detennining if health information 
is not individually identifiable, or "de-identified," and thus no longer regulated by the rule. 
First, an expert utilizing accepted analytical techniques can conclude that "the risk is very 
small that the information could be used, alone or in combination with other reasonably 
available information" to identify the subject of the information. Id. § 164.514(b)(I)(i). A 
second pennitted means of de-identification is that the covered entity can remove a compre-
hensive set of identifiers of the individual and of relatives, employers, and household members 
of the individual. These identifiers include: names; geographic subdivisions smaller than a 
state; dates more specific than years; contact information such as telephone and fax numbers 
and e-mail addresses; identification numbers such as Social Security numbers, account and 
medical record numbers, and license place numbers; and full face photographic images. !d. § 
164.514(b)(2)(i)(I)(C). 
68. Cf Varon F. Dunkel, Medical Privacy Rights in Anonymous Data: Discussion of Rights in 
the United Kingtkm and the United States in Light of the Source Informatics Cases, 23 Loy. L.A. 
INT'L & COMPo L. REv. 41 (2001). 
69. Information can be ostensibly anonymous, yet linkable to an individual because of codes 
frequently utilized by health care organizations, researchers, and the government. Concern 
is raised about deliberate or accidental disclosures of coded information, not literally protected 
by law, where the code is broken or inadequate. See Gostin, supra note 5, at 520. 
70. The code must not be derived from or related to information about the individual or 
able to be translated so that the individual can be identified. 45 C.F.R. § 164.514(c)(I). The 
covered entity must also not disclose or use the code for other purposes than record identi-
fication and cannot disclose the mechanism for re-identification.!d. § 164.514(c)(2). 
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PHI is comprised of all forms of information, including electronic, oral, 
and paper communications.71 Realistically, it is impractical to separate pro-
tections for paper-based records from electronic or oral-based data. Under 
HIPAA, Congress may have limited HHS's authority to regulate nonelec-
tronic communication.72 Although HHS maintains that it has "ample legal 
authority,"73 provisions concerning nonelectronic communications are sev-
erable from electronic communications by court action.74 Protecting all 
health information enhances the efficacy of the regulation. Otherwise, a 
significant amount of nonelectronic health communications would remain 
unregulated by federal law. Additional complications relate to enforcing a 
national regulation that applies to only some types of health data depending 
on how they are communicated or stored.75 
Who Is Covered? HHS regulates "covered entities," which include all 
possible groups that it is authorized to reach under HIPAA. These covered 
entities include health plans, health care clearinghouses, and health care 
providers.76 Health plans, which provide or pay for the cost of medical 
care, are covered whether they are private entities (e.g., health insurer, 
71. !d. § 164.501 (defining "protected health infonnation"). 
72. Section 264 ofHIPAA, which contains the congressional mandate to HHS to develop 
the privacy standard, evolved because of the administrative simplification goals of the statute 
related to electronic infonnation exchange. See Standards for Privacy ofIndividually Identi-
fiable Health Infonnation, 65 Fed. Reg. 82,469 (2001); Eddy, supra note 64, at 18. Some 
commentators have suggested that because section 264 was developed to counteract negative 
effects of the administrative simplification provisions, HHS could only regulate privacy con-
cerns for the narrow set of electronic transactions covered in those provisions. See Eddy, supra 
note 63, at 18-20. However, the statute in section 264 describes the scope ofHHS authority 
in tenns of regulation of individual rights over individWllly identifiable health information, not 
electronic transactions or administrative simplification. The statute states that if Congress 
does not meet its deadline, HHS must "at least" develop regulations that address: "(I) The 
rights that an individual who is a subject of individually identifiable health infonnation should 
haver;] (2) The procedures that should be established for the exercise of such rights[; and] 
(3) The uses and disclosures of such infonnation that should be authorized or required." Pub. 
L. No. 104-191, § 264(b), 110 Stat. 1936,2033 (1996) (this subsection gives the requirements 
for HHS's recommendation to Congress when Congress is considering legislation before its 
self-imposed deadline has passed. In a cross-reference to (b), section 264(c) applies these 
requirements to the regulations that are mandated if Congress does not meet its deadline). 
The use of "at least" and the lack of a reference to the administrative simplification sections 
or electronic transactions in these detailed requirements suggest that Congress did not intend 
to limit HHS to protecting privacy in electronic transactions only. HEALTH PRIVACY PROJECT, 
supra note 60, at 5. Nevertheless, ambiguity remains about HHS's scope of authority. 
73. Standards for Privacy of Individually Identifiable Health Infonnation, 65 Fed. Reg. 
82,496 (2001). 
74. Id. In a successful court challenge to the broad coverage then, the judge could order 
that the phrase "regarding non-electronic infonnation" be struck from the regulation while 
the standard would remain intact for electronic communications. 
75. See HEALTH PRIVACY PROJECT, supra note 60, at 6-7;Joy Pritts et al., The State of Health 
Privacy: An Uneven Terrain (1999), at http://www.georgetown.edulresearchlihcrp/privacy/ 
sta tereport. pdf. 
76. 45 C.F.R. § 160.102. 
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managed care organization) or government organizations (e.g., Medicaid, 
Medicare, the Veterans Administration)J7 Health care providers (e.g., phy-
sicians, hospitals, clinics) are covered if they "transmit any health infor-
mation in electronic form in connection with a transaction covered by [the 
regulation]."78 Such electronic exchanges can include billing and fund 
transfers in addition to health information communications. 
The regulations also cover business associates of the covered entities. 
Business associates are lawyers, accountants, billing companies, and other 
contractors whose positions involve the use or disclosure of individually 
identifiable health informationJ9 Although HHS lacks the authority to 
directly regulate business associates, it requires covered entities to obtain 
satisfactory assurances that their business associates will comply with pri-
vacy standards.80 Should a covered entity know of a violation and do noth-
ing to address it, the covered entity may be considered to be violating 
IDPAA's privacy standards.81 Through this oversight function, HHS is able 
to regulate the downstream users and processors of PHI.82 
Although the regulations are comprehensive, not all persons or entities 
that regularly use, disclo~e, or store identifiable health data are covered. 
The regulations do not cover groups such as life insurers and worker's 
compensation insurers and programs, even though these entities regularly 
use personal medical information.83 Additional protections governing all 
identifiable health data, regardless of its holder or manner of communi-
cation, are needed to complete a national standard of health information 
prIvacy. 
B. Privacy and Security Policies for Covered Entities 
In addition to an individual's right to control uses and disclosures, the 
development of privacy and security policies for covered entities is impor-
tant to prevent privacy breaches and maintain consumers' trust in the 
health care system. WIthout such policies, accidental disclosures from 
77. Id. § 160.103 (defining "health plan"). Employers utilizing employer-sponsored health 
plans (governed by ERISA) are not considered covered entities when administering the plan 
(as "plan sponsors"). However, the standard outlines numerous requirements for employer-
sponsored health plans, which are covered entities, to disclose PHI to plan sponsors/ 
employers, including an agreement that the sponsor will not use or disclose the information 
for employment decisions. /d. § 164.504(f)(I), (2). 
78. Id. § 160.102(a)(3). 
79. Id. § 160.103. 
80. Id. § 164.502(e)(I)(i). 
81. Id. § 164.502 (e)(iii). 
82. See Lawrence O. Gostin, National Health Information Privacy: Regulations Under the 
Health Insurance Portability and Accountability Act, 285 JAMA 3015, 3016 (2001). 
83. See generally James G. Hodge, Jr., The Intersection of Federal Health Information Privacy 
and State Administrative Lou': The Protection of Individlllli Health Data and Worker's Compen-
sation, 51 ADMIN. L. REv. 117 (1999). 
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sloppy record keeping and purposeful disclosures by and to unscrupulous 
parties may increase.84 The health data privacy regulations mandate that 
covered entities develop privacy and security policies while maintaining 
the flexibility necessary for the large variety of participants covered.85 Cov-
ered entities must implement policies that reasonably protect individuals 
from any "intentional or unintentional use or disclosure in violation of the 
standards, implementation specifications or other requirements."86 Cov-
ered entities must not only guard against a deliberate attempt to use pro-
tected information, but must also endeavor to prevent accidental uses and 
disclosures. Procedures must be developed to allow for complaints con-
cerning the policies or the covered entities' compliance with the policiesY 
Persons who violate privacy policies could be sanctioned.88 
A covered entity may not require an individual to waive these rights in 
order to receive care, enroll in a health plan, or obtain benefits.89 However, 
covered entities are not mandated to create a formal appeals process or a 
form of "due process."90 When violations occur, the covered entity must 
mitigate "to the extent practicable" any harmful effect known to result from 
the infraction.91 
84. For more on the impact on personal privacy from security policies, see generally HEALTH 
PRIVACY PROJECT, supra note 60, at 20-22. 
85. Specific concerns calling for flexibility include that the namre of the health information 
held by covered entities may differ, smaller organizations may be burdened greatly by re-
quirements more appropriate for larger firms, and the swift changes in technology may re-
quire a fast process to update the privacy and security policies. See Gostin, supra note 5, at 
526. 
86. 45 C.ER. § 164.530(c)(2). Group health plans that provide benefits only through a 
health maintenance organization (HMO) or an issuer and that do not create, receive, or 
maintain PHI are not subject to any of the requirements under this section except documen-
tation of their plan materials. ld. § 164.530(k). The issuers and HMOs must still follow all of 
the elements of the privacy and security policy mandates. See Standards for Privacy of indi-
vidually Identifiable Health Information, 65 Fed. Reg. 82,563-64 (2001). 
87. 45 C.ER. § 164.530(d). Covered entities are also forbidden from taking any "intimi-
dating or retaliatory acts" against an individual involved in the privacy policy process, in-
cluding those filing a complaint. !d. § 164.530(g). 
88. ld. § 164.530(e)(I). 
89. ld. § 164.530(h). 
90. Standards for Privacy of Individually Identifiable Health Information, 65 Fed. Reg. 
82,562 (2001). 
91. 45 C.F.R. § 164.530(f). Balancing the protections for individuals allows flexibility for 
businesses. Every covered entity is not compelled to develop the same privacy and security 
policies. Instead, the policies must be "reasonably designed, taking into account the size 
of and the type of activities that relate to PHI undertaken by the covered entity." ld. 
§ 164.530(i)(I). This generalized description of the requirement allows small businesses to 
develop plans that reflect the namre and size of their enterprise without burdening them 
more than necessary. Small businesses may still find some of the requirements overly bur-
densome. For example, a sole practitioner largely relying on paper medical records might be 
challenged by the need to prevent accidental disclosure from a misplaced record. As the health 
data privacy rule mandates that covered entities' privacy policies "promptly" comply with 
changes in law, id. § 164.530(i)(3), further difficulties can arise for small businesses with 
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C. Fair Information Practices 
Persons and entities maintaining PHI must adhere to a range of fair in-
formation practices that allow individuals to make informed choices about 
the delivery and financing of their health care. The health data privacy 
regulations proscribe several fair information practices for health consum-
ers, including the right to: (1) notice; (2) access protected health infor-
mation; (3) amend protected health information; and (4) request an ac-
counting of disclosures. 
Notice. Health care consumers have the right to adequate notice of the 
uses and disclosures of PHI that may be made by the covered entity.92 
Individuals are also entitled to know their legal rights, as well as the covered 
entity's privacy and security policies, including fair information practices 
requiremenl:!>.93 The notice must be in plain language.94 Health plans must 
provide notice to covered individuals by the regulation's compliance date, 
while health care providers must provide this notice upon the first service 
delivery after the compliance date.95 Additionally, consumer safeguards ap-
ply to covered entities that provide notice electronically.96 
Access to Protected Health Information. The new regulations offer individ-
uals a broad opportunity to access their PHI.97 Access rights include an on-
site inspection of the records and the provision of copies of their records.98 
Covered entities must act within thirty days upon the request for access to 
health data.99 If the individual agrees in advance, the covered entity may 
limited resources to monitor legal developments and implement swift changes. See Gostin, 
supra note 82, at 3018. 
92. 45 c.F.R. § 164.520(a)(1). For more on the necessity of providing such notice, see 
generally Gostin, supra note 5, at 522-24; HEALTH PRIVACY PROJECT, supra note 60, at 19-
20. 
93. 45 C.F.R. § 164.520(a)(l). The notice must include information about how individuals 
may complain about potential Inisuses or violations to the covered entity and the Secretary 
of HHS or about how to contact the covered entity with questions. Id. § 164.520(b)(vi). 
94. Id. § 164.520(b)(1). 
95. Id. § 162.520(c)(1)(i)(A), (c)(2)(i). New enrollees must get the notice at the time of 
enrollment. At least once every three years, the health plan must notify enrollees in the plan 
that the notice is available and the methods by which they can obtain it. Id. § 164.520(c)(1)(i), 
(c)(2). 
96. An individual must agree to obtain the notice via e-mail. A paper copy must be provided 
if the covered entity knows that the e-mail transInissionfailed.ld. § 164.520(c)(3)(ii). Health 
care providers must give electronic notice automatically and simultaneously when their first 
service delivery is electronic. /d. § 164.520(c)(3)(iii). If a covered entity maintains a website 
that offers information about its benefits and services, it must also prominently post its notice 
on the website as well as make it available electronically. !d. § 164.520(c)(3)(i). 
97. Id. § 164.524. The covered entity may require that the request be in writing. Id. 
§ 164.524(b)(1). For more on the significance of the individual's ability to access his or her 
personal medical data, see Gostin, supra note 5, at 524; HEALTH PRIVACY PROJECT, supra note 
60, at 18-19. 
98. 45 C.F.R § 164.524(c)(1). 
99. Id. § 164.524(b)(2)(i). Sixty days is allowed if the information is held off-site. Id. 
§ 164.524(b)(2)(ii). Delay is also allowed if the covered entity informs the individual in writing 
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provide a summary of the Pill instead of the actual documents. loo The 
standard does permit narrow, unreviewable reasons for denial regarding 
requests for psychotherapy notes; information likely to be used in a civil, 
criminal, or administrative proceeding; and requests by inmates to their 
correctional facility or health care provider that might threaten the health 
or safety of the individual or others.101 Also, in limited circumstances,102 a 
covered entity may deny access although the individual may request a re-
view of the grounds for denial.I03 If the covered entity decides to deny 
access to the individual of any part of the Pill, the health data privacy 
regulation ensures a fair and informed process. I04 
Amend Protected Health Information. Individuals can amend their PHI if 
they report inaccuracies or missing information. lOS The covered entity must 
act within sixty days on a request to amend. 106 If the covered entity agrees 
to the amendment, it must: (1) identify the records that are affected by 
the amendment; (2) append or provide a link to the amendment;107 and 
(3) inform the individual of the amendment. lOS Additional covered entities 
that possess or receive the data must correctly amend their records con-
cerning the relevant individual. l09 As with access rights, covered entities 
of the reasons why it requires more time and when the request will be granted. Id. 
§ 164.524(b)(2)(iii)(A). 
100. Id. § 1 64. 524(c)(2)(ii). 
101. /d. § 164.524(a)(1)(ii), (a)(2)(ii). Infonnation obtained from another based on a prom-
ise of confidentiality that would likely reveal the identity of the source may be denied without 
review.ld. § 164.524(a)(2)(v). Health care providers may also temporarily deny access during 
research based on an individual's care if the individual has consented to both the research 
and the denial of access during research. /d. § 164.524(a)(2)(iii). 
102. These situations include where a licensed health care professional determines that 
access will endanger the life or physical safety of the individual or another person. /d. 
§ 164.524(a)(3)(ii). 
103. Id. § 164.524(a)(3). This provision specifically covers determinations that references 
to another person will endanger that other individual, or that, if a personal representative is 
making the request, substantial hann will come to the individual or another person. Id. 
§ 164.524(a)(3)(ii). 
104. The denial must be in writing and in plain language. It must explain the reasons for 
the denial, any rights for review over the decision, and methods of complaint to the covered 
entity.ld. § 164.524(d)(2)(i)-(iii). Access should be granted to any infonnation that does not 
meet the specific grounds for denial. /d. § 164.524(d)(1). If a review of the denial is warranted, 
it is conducted by a licensed health care professional who is designated by the covered entity 
but is not directly involved in the decision to deny access. Id. § 1 64.524(d)(4). 
105. /d. § 164.526(a)(l). See Gostin, supra note 5, at 524, and HEALTH PRIVACY PROJECT, 
supra note 60, at 19, for more on the significance of this right. 
106. 45 C.ER. § 164.526(b)(2)(i). An extension of thirty days is possible if the covered 
entity explains the reasons for delay and the date on which it will respond to the request in 
writing to the individual. Id. § 164.526(b)(2)(ii). 
107. /d. § 164.526(c)(l). 
108. Id. § 164.526(c)(2), (3)(i). It must also notify persons or entities (1) identified by the 
individual as needing the amended infonnation, or (2) known by the covered entity to have 
Pill about the individual and who may rely on the infonnation to the detriment of the 
individual. /d. 
109. Id. § 164.526(e). 
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may deny amendments in certain circumstances, including upon a deter-
mination that the record is "accurate and complete."llo The entity must 
then give written notice to the individual. III Yet, unlike disputes over access 
denial, there is no final review to clarify which party, the individual or the 
covered entity, is correct. Should the individual disagree in writing,1I2 the 
covered entity can respond with a written rebuttal, which must be included 
in future disclosures.1I3 
Request an Accounting of Disclosures. Patients have a limited right to receive 
an accounting of disclosures of their PHI (other than for disclosures related 
to treatment, payment, and health care operations, among other °excep-
tionsll4) over the six-year period prior to the request}15 The accounting 
includes the name of the person or entity that received the information 
(and their address if known), the date of the disclosure, a brief description 
of the information disclosed, and a brief explanation of the reasons for 
disclosure if not authorized by the patient. I 16 
D. The Effects of Preemption 
Under HIPAA, HHS cannot preempt state health information privacy laws 
that are more protective of patients than the national rule.1I7 Some states 
may offer more protections through, for example, "superconfidentiality" 
laws for genetic, mental health, or HIV/AIDS information. Thus, because 
existing federal or state laws that provide more privacy protections remain, 
HHS's privacy regulations create a federal "floor" of protections. 
This multilevel approach allows states to tailor health information pri-
110. Id. § 164.S26(a)(2)(iv). Other grounds for denial are: (I) if the covered entity did not 
create the information or record, it may deny the request unless the individual reasonably 
shows that the originator of the information is no longer available to address the amendment 
request, and (2) if the individual could not access the record because of restrictions laid out 
in § 164.524 (see Part II above). /d. § 164.526(a)(2)(i), (iii). 
Ill. Id. § 164.526(d)(l). It must be in plain language and explain the reasons for the denial, 
any rights for review over the decision, and methods of complaint to the covered entity. Id. 
112. Id. § 164.S26(d)(2). 
113. Id. § 164.526(d)(S)(i). The individual must be provided with a copy of the rebuttal. 
Id. § 164.526(d)(3). The written statement and rebuttal must then be appended or linked to 
the appropriate records by the covered entity, see id. § 164.S26(d)(4), and included, when 
relevant, in any future disclosures. Id. § 164.526(d)(S)(i). If the individual has not submitted 
a written statement of disagreement, then the request for amendment and the covered entity's 
denial must be included if the individual has requested such disclosure./d. § 164.526(d)(S)(ii). 
114. Excluded disclosures include those: for national security and intelligence purposes, to 
correctional institutions, and from health oversight agencies or law enforcement officials who 
document that the agency's officials would be impeded if the accounting revealed the disclo-
sure.ld. § 164.528(a)(1)(i)-(v). 
liS. Id. § 164.S28(a)(1). 
116. Id. § 164.528(b)(2)(i)-(iv). 
117. See id. § 160.203(b). State laws are also not preempted if they promote certain goods 
such as public health, efficacy in payment of health care, fraud prevention, and audits and 
program monitoring. Id. § 160.203(a), (c), (d). 
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vacy policies to the specific needs of their populations, but there are at least 
two disadvantages: (1) it allows individuals in some states to benefit from 
greater privacy protections than in others, and (2) where most electronic 
health data are exchanged across state boundaries, covered entities (spe-
cifically, larger health providers, plans, and clearinghouses) must adhere to 
national and regional privacy standards. This results in higher costs than 
would occur if a uniform national standard were in place. 
IV. BALANCING INDIVIDUAL AND COMMUNAL INTERESTS 
IN HEALTH DATA: USES AND DISCLOSURES OF 
HEALTH INFORMATION 
A. Disclosures of Protected Health I1lformatio1l 
Under the national privacy regulations, individuals exercise some level of 
control over the use and disclosure of PHI, which ensures individual pri-
vacy protection from unlimited sharing of personal medical data. The prin-
cipal question, however, is how much control individuals should exercise. 
Privacy protections that allow consumers to restrict the flow of their data 
through informed consent or advance authorization requirements may 
hinder the collection of comprehensive and accurate information that may 
benefit health consumers}IB 
The regulations differentiate among the various purposes for which data 
may be used and disclosed. Uses and disclosures for health care-related 
purposes (e.g., provision or payment for health care services) are liberally 
permitted, albeit with the advance "informed consent" of each patient. 
Uses and disclosures of PHI for other purposes outside the health care 
context are limited. Disclosures may only be made pursuant to written 
authorization by the individual, subject to some exceptions. In either con-
text, a minimum disclosure rule applies: when using or disclosing PHI, the 
covered entity must make reasonable efforts to limit the information to the 
minimum necessary to accomplish its purpose. 1 19 The minimum disclosure 
rule helps patients maintain privacy by enhancing patient autonomy and 
promoting their trust in the health care system (e.g., in reimbursement 
transactions, where only specific health information is needed).120 
118. See Douglas Sharrott, Provider-Specific Quolity-ofCare Data: A Proposal for Limited 
Mandatory Disclosure, 58 BROOK. L. REv. 85 (1992). 
119. 45 C.F.R. § 164.502(b)(1). 
120. See HHS, Standards, supra note 61. HHS's recent guidance has clarified a significant 
concern of health care providers over the permitted uses during treatment when consulting 
with other physicians or medical staff. The standard as written specifies that the minimum 
disclosure requirement applies for use of PHI during treatment by health care providers, but 
not disclosures. This has caused confusion about how health care providers can utilize vital 
health information in the course of treatment as they work with other medical professionals. 
In the July 2001 guidance, HHS explained that the exemption for disclosures during treatment 
allows health care providers to share information with other providers. 
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Rules protecting the privacy of individuals are most important when the 
benefit to the individual is large, and the burden on the public is small. 
The following sections clarify that informed consent, which applies for 
health care-related purposes, provides little benefit to the individual at 
some cost to society, while written authorization, which applies for non-
health care-related purposes, is a somewhat more effective means of pro-
tecting individual privacy. 
1. Written Consent for Disclosure and Use for Health Care Purposes 
The regulations presently require covered health care entities to obtain 
written consent from individuals before using or disclosing information for 
treatment, payment, or health care operations. Such consent must: (1) be 
in plain languagej121 (2) inform the individual that PHI may be used and 
disclosed to carry out treatment, payment, or health care operationsj122 
(3) indicate that the individual can revoke the consent in writingj 123 and 
(4) include a request that the covered entity restrict how PHI is used or 
disclosed for health care purposes (although the covered entity is not re-
quired to agree).124 Certain exceptions for specific disclosures are discussed 
below. 
The written consent requirement for use and disclosure of PHI in health 
care activities is largely inadequate. 125 Consent under these circumstances 
is neither informed nor consensual. A patient may sign a consent form on 
his or her first visit to a physician that applies to all future disclosures and 
uses. In such cases, the individual will not be aware of the substance of the 
data protected, because the individual will typically not know what infor-
mation is contained in his or her current records or what may be contained 
in his or her future medical records. 126 At the time of consent, the patient 
will also not be aware of the specific uses or disclosures because the form 
need only say "treatment, payment, or health care operations." For these 
reasons, his or her execution of a written authorization prior to treatment 
is uninformed. Such authorization alSo lacks effective consent where the 
rule allows providers to condition enrollment in a plan or medical treat-
ment on whether the individual signs the consent form.127 As a result, the 
patient can be coerced into consenting if he or she wants to obtain treat-
ment or health insurance. 128 
121. 45 c.F.R. § 164.506(c). 
122. [d. § 164.506(c)(1). The consent may not be combined in a single document with the 
notice.ld. § 164.506(b)(3). 
123. ld. § 164.506(c)(5). 
124. [d. § 164.506(c)(4)(i). If the covered entity does agree, the agreement is binding. See 
id. § 164.522(a)(i) (restating the standard for an individual's right to request restrictions of 
'uses and disclosures and documenting the requirements for termination of the restrictions). 
125. Note that the requirement was not in the proposed rule. 
126. See Gostin, supra note 82, at 3017. 
127. 45 C.F.R. § 164.506(b)(1), (2). 
128. See HEALTH PRIVACY PROJECT, supra note 60, at 16; Pritts, supra note 75. 
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2. Authorization for Disclosures Not Related to Health Care 
A different consent model for disclosures and uses of PHI unrelated to 
health care (e.g., for employment decisions or evaluation of credit status) 
is employed in the regulations. Prior to using or disclosing PHI for non-
health care purposes, covered entities must obtain a written authorization 
from the individual. The authorization, unlike the written consent required 
for health care purposes, contains specific information to help individuals 
decide whether to permit disclosure or use. Such authorizations must: 
(1) identify the information to be used or disclosed in a "specific and mean-
ingful fashion";129 (2) provide the names of the persons or organizations 
who will make and receive the use or disclosures;I30 (3) explain the purpose 
for each request; (4) notify the individual of his or her right to refuse to 
sign the authorization without negative consequences to treatment or 
health plan eligibility (except under specific circumstances);I31 (5) be writ-
ten in plain language;I32 (6) include an expiration date;I33 and (7) explain 
that the individual has a right to revoke the authorizationI34 at any time in 
writing except regarding actions taken by the covered entity in reliance of 
the authorization. 135 Unlike the informed consent requirement for health 
care-related disclosures, the individual's choice is respected. The exercise 
of the right of refusal cannot be used to deny the patient treatment or 
health insurance. 136 
B. Making Exceptions: Balancing Communal Goods and Personal Privacy 
The privacy regulations do, however, make several exceptions to the au-
thorization provisions related to the use and disclosure of PHI. These 
exceptions include disclosures: (1) to law enforcement officials; (2) for ju-
dicial and administrative proceedings; (3) to parents of unemancipated mi-
nors; (4) to "significant others," such as family members, close friends, or 
designated persons, of an adult or an emancipated minor; (5) to authorized 
129. 45 C.F.R. § 164.508(c)(I)(i). 
130. /d. § 164.508(c)(I)(ii), (iii). 
131. Id. § 164.508(e)(I)(iii). 
132. Id. § 164.508(c)(2). 
133. Id. § 164.508(c)(I)(iv). 
134. /d. § 164.508(c)(I)(v). 
135. !d. § 164.508(b)(5)(i). 
136. /d. § 164.508(b)(4). There are some limited exceptions. One is that health care pro-
vjders may condition provision of research-related treatment on authorization. Another is 
that if the covered entity is gathering individually identifiable health information solely for 
the purposes of disclosing it to a third party, such as an employer, the covered entity may 
condition this care on the authorization to disclose it to the third party. Further protection 
is offered regarding psychotherapy notes; authorization is always required for use and disclo-
sure of psychotherapy notes except in specified health care operations. /d. § 164.508(b)(5)(i)-
(iv). 
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public health authorities; (6) for health research; and (7) for commercial 
marketing purposes. 
Law Enforcement. A covered entity may disclose Pill to a law enforcement 
official without informed consent pursuant to a court order, subpoena, or 
administrative request, including a civil investigative demand or an admin-
istrative subpoena. 137 Judges are given no criteria from which to make their 
determination as they balance individual privacy and law enforcement. In 
addition, a covered entity may disclose limited information138 without prior 
judicial approval where: (1) the information relates to a crime victim who is 
incapacitated and disclosure is necessary and in the best interests of the 
individual;139 (2) Pill is evidence of criminal conduct that occurred on the 
premises of the covered entity;l4Q and (3) in the course of an emergency, 
disclosure is necessary to alert law enforcement officials of the location, 
commission, and nature of the crime, victims, or perpetrators. 141 
Judicial and Administrative Proceedings. Pill may be disclosed at any ju-
dicial or administrative proceeding without the person's permission in re-
sponse to a court order or administrative tribunal. 142 As in the law enforce-
ment context, judges are given no criteria in the regulation to exercise their 
discretion. Covered entities may also disclose health information in re-
sponse to a subpoena or discovery request if the requester (1) reasonably 
attempts to inform the patient of the disclosure,143 or (2) reasonably at-
137. !d. § 164.512(f)(1). When an administrative request is utilized, the regulation lays out 
certain requirements: (1) the information sought must be relevant and material to a legitimate 
law enforcement inquiry; (2) the request must be specific and limited in scope to the extent 
reasonably practicable; and (3) de-identified information must not be able to be reasonably 
used.Id. § 164.512(f)(1)(C)(1)-(3). See Peter Van Der Goes, Jr., Comment, Opportunity Lost: 
Why and How to Improve the HHS-proposed Legislation Governing Law Enforcement Access to 
Medical Records, 147 U. PA. L. REV. 1009, 1065-66 (1999). 
138. The permitted information is name, address, date and place of birth, Social Security 
number, blood type, type of injury, date and time of treatment, and a description of distin-
guishing characteristics. 45 c.F.R. § 164.512(f)(2)(i)(A)-(H). 
139. Id. § 164.512(f)(3). The specific criteria are: (1) the law enforcement official represents 
that the information is needed to determine whether a crime was committed by an individual 
other than the victim and that the information will not be used against the victim; (2) the law 
enforcement official represents that immediate law enforcement activities would be jeopar-
dized by waiting for consent; and (3) the covered entity determines that the disclosure is in 
the best interest of the individual. Id. § 164.512(f)(3)(iii)(A)-(C). If the patient is competent 
and no emergency exists, the patient must agree under the exception for the disclosure to 
occur. !d. § 164.512(f)(3)(ii). 
140. Id. § 164.512(f)(5). 
141. Id. § 164.512(f)(6)(i)(A)-(C). 
142. Id. § 164.512(e)(I)(i). 
143. Id. § 164.512(e)(I)(ii)(A). The covered entity must obtain satisfactory assurances that 
the party requesting information has made a good-faith attempt to provide written notice to 
the individual and that the notice included sufficient information about the litigation to 
permit the individual to raise an objection in the proceedings. The covered entity must 
also be given assurances that the time for the individual to raise objections to the court has 
elapsed and that any objections given were resolved in the favor of the requester. !d. 
§ 164.512(e)(I)(iii)(A)-(C). 
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tempts to obtain a protective order to prohibit the recipients from using 
or disclosing the information for purposes other than the litigation. 144 In-
stead of placing the burden on litigants seeking the information, the regu-
lation requires that patients make objections to the court. 
Minors. Disclosures to parents of unemancipated minors are exempted 
from consent requirements in multiple cases. If state law forbids or requires 
that parents be informed about their children's health conditions, the regu-
lation allows state law to stand. 145 While many states permit competent 
minors to receive medical treatment for potentially stigmatizing conditions 
without parental consent,l46 states could pass laws requiring parents to be 
informed about their child's condition and treatment. Where no state law 
exists, the regulation allows parents to serve as personal representatives, 147 
who generally can act on behalf of the individual,148 with some restric-
tions. 149 The Bush administration has suggested that it may modify the rule 
to increase parental access. 150 
"Significant Others" of Adults and Emancipated Minors. Disclosures to "sig-
nificant others" (i.e., family, friends, caretakers, or health care surrogates) 
of adults and emancipated minors are narrowly exempted. Covered entities 
may disclose limited health information to "significant others" without 
consent if the patient is informed in advance and has the opportUnity to 
agree. l5l The disclosed PHI must be (1) directly relevant to the person's 
involvement with the patient's care or payment for care,152 or (2) used to 
notify that person of the patient's location, general health condition, or 
144. /d. § 164.512(e)(1)(ii)(B). The party requesting information must give the covered 
entity satisfactory assurances that the parties have agreed to a qualified protective order or 
that the requester has asked for a qualified protected order. /d. § 164.512(e)(1)(iv). The stan-
dard defines qualified protective order as one that prohibits the parties from using or dis-
closing PHI for any purpose other than litigation or proceeding for which the information 
was requested and requires the PHI's return to the covered entity or destruction at the end 
of the proceeding. /d. § 164.512(e)(1)(v)(A). 
145. /d. § 160.202 (defining "more stringent"). 
146. See Gostin, supra note 82, at 3017. 
147. 45 c.F.R. § 164.502(g)(1). 
148. Id. § 164.502(g)(2). 
149. If the minor consents to the health care service, the parent agrees to confidentiality 
between the provider and the minor, or the minor consents and does not wish the parent to 
be the personal representative, then the parent is not considered a personal representative. 
Id. § 164.502(g)(3). 
150. Thompson Press Release, supra note 2, 'H 10. ("[W]e will make it clear through guide-
lines or recommended modifications that ... parents will have access to information about 
the health and well-being of their children, including information about mental health, sub-
stance abuse or abortion."). The July 2001 guidance indicated that the Secretary is still con-
sidering such action. See HHS, Standards, supra note 62 (indicating that Secretary Thompson 
is still considering actions to increase parental access). 
151. 45 C.F.R. § 164.51O(b)(1), (2). Disclosure is also permitted if the covered entity can 
reasonably infer from the circumstances that the patient does not object to disclosure. Id. 
§ 164.510(b)(2)(iii). 
152. Id. § 164.510(b)(1)(i). 
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death. 153 In cases of incapacitation or emergency, disclosures to "significant 
others" may be made in the patient's best interest when directly relevant 
to the entities' involvement with the individual's care. 154 
Public Health. The health data privacy rule broadly exempts155 disclosures 
of PHI for routine public health activities.156 This includes disclosures: 
(1) where federal or state law authorizes public health authorities157 to col-
lect PHI to prevent or control disease, injury, or disability, or to report 
child abuse or neglect; (2) to notify persons who may be at risk for or 
exposed to a communicable disease (e.g., partner notification provisions); 158 
and (3) concerning adverse events, tracks and recalls of products, and post-
marketing surveillance by persons subject to the jurisdiction of the Food 
and Drug Administration. 159 State reporting or other public health laws 
are not preempted by the rule even if they offer less privacy protections, 160 
thus leaving public health information privacy law to the states. 
Health Research. Most federally funded human subject research is cur-
rently subject to federal regulations known as the Common Rule,161 which 
does not contain detailed privacy standards, but rather conditions IRB ap-
proval of research on whether "there are adequate provisions to protect 
the privacy ofsubjects."162 Although the Common Rule is a helpful guide 
for protecting the privacy and other ethical interests of human research 
subjects, it does not apply to privately funded research. The health data 
privacy rule closes this gap between the public and private sectors by pro-
viding more detailed requirements than the Common Rule. A covered en-
tity may only use or disclose PHI for research without the person's per-
mission if it obtains a waiver from an IRB or privacy board163 that finds 
153. !d. § 164.51O(b)(I)(ii). 
154. !d. § 164.51O(b)(3). The rule allows relatives and close personal friends to perform 
common care-taking duties such as picking up prescriptions, medical supplies, etc. [d. 
155. !d. § 164.514(b)(2) (clarifying that all of the exceptions apply to uses of PHI as well 
as disclosures in the public health exemptions section). 
156. See Gostin, supra note 82, at 3016. 
157. Public health authority is expansively defined as a federal, tribal, state, or local agency, 
or a person or entity with a grant of authority or contract with the agency. 45 C.ER. § 164.501 
(defining "public health authority"). 
158. [d. § 164.512(b)(I)(iv). 
159. !d. § 164.512(b)(I)(iii)(A)-(D). 
160. See id. § 160.203. 
161. See Protection of Human Subjects, 56 Fed. Reg. 28,003 Gune 18, 1991) (codified at 
45 C.ER. § 46). 
162. 45 C.ER. § 46.11 I (a)(7). In the Common Rule, if consent is required, the researcher 
must provide the subject with "[a] statement describing the extent, if any, to which confiden-
tiality of records identifying the subject will be maintained." [d. § 46.116(a)(5). The Common 
Rule also applies to research conducted in anticipation of Food and Drug Administration 
approval. 
163. See id. § 164.512(b)(I)(i). The privacy board must have members with varying 
backgrounds, appropriate professional competency, and no conflict of interest. [d. 
§ 164.512(i)(I)(i)(B). At least one member must be unaffiliated with the covered entity and 
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that: (1) the use or disclosure involves no more than minimal risk; (2) the 
waiver will not adversely affect the privacy rights and welfare of the indi-
vidual; (3) the research could not practicably be conducted without the 
waiver; (4) the privacy risks are reasonable in relation to the anticipated 
benefits to the individual, and in relation to the importance of the research; 
(5) a plan exists to protect the identifiable information from improper use 
and disclosure; (6) a plan to destroy the identifiers exists unless there is a 
health or research justification for retaining them; and (7) there are written 
assurances that the data will not be reused or disclosed to others, except 
for research that would also qualify for a waiver.l64 Researchers must also 
show that PHI is necessary for the research, will not be disclosed to out-
siders, and is sought solely to prepare for the research. 165 While certain 
critics are concerned over the burdens imposed by the new requirements, 166 
the regulation fairly ensures that there are valid justifications for utilizing 
PHI for research without consent. 
Commercial Marketing. In contrast to some of the other exceptions, which 
offer either greater or similar protections than the law currently provides, 
the exception for commercial marketing provides for less privacy protec-
tion by condoning the use or disclosure of PHI for commercial marketing 
without consent.167 PHI may be used or disclosed without consent for mar-
keting communications to the individual that occur in face-to-face en-
counters (whether health related or not),168 concern products or services 
of nominal value, or concern health-related products and services of the 
covered entity or a third party. 169 A covered entity may target persons based 
on their health status if the product or service may benefit them. 170 How-
ever, commercial communications must identify the covered entity, disclose 
whether the entity is receiving remuneration for the communication or 
sale, and instruct individuals on how they can opt out of receiving future 
communications. If a covered entity targets persons based on their health 
research entity. !d. § 164.512(i)(I)(i)(B)(2). This includes relatives of individuals affiliated with 
the organizations. !d. A majority of the privacy board must be present when considering a 
waiver, including the unaffiliated member. Id. § 164.512(i)(2)(iv)(B). 
164. Id. § 164.512(i)(2)(ii)(A)-(H). 
165. Id. § 164.512(i)(I)(ii)(A)-(C). See also Mark Barnes & Sara Krauss, The EffectsofHIPAA 
on Human Subject Research, 10 HEALTH L. REP. 1026, 1030-31 (2001). 
166. See, e.g., Barnes & Krauss, supra note 165, at 1031 (arguing that IRBs are ill-prepared 
to make the assessments now required of them by the health data privacy regulation);}ocelyn 
Kaiser, Researchers Say Rules Are Too Restrictive, 294 SCIENCE 2070 (2001); J. Kulynych & D. 
Korn, The Effect of the New Federal Medical-Privacy Rule on Research, 346 NEW ENG. J. MED. 
201 (2002). 
167. See Robert Gellman, Analysis of the Marketing Provisions of the HIPAA Privacy Rules, 
available at http://www.hipaadvisory.comlactionlprivacy/marketing.htm (last visited Apr. 13, 
2002). 
168. See id. 'II 7. 
169. 45 C.ER. § 164.514(e)(2)(A)-(C). 
170. !d. § 164.514(e)(3)(ii)(A). 
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status, it must predetermine whether the product or service may benefit 
those persons and indicate why they have been selected.17l 
V. CONCLUSION 
The systematic electronic collection, use, and disclosure of individually 
identifiable health information are essential to achieving several important 
communal goals. Public health authorities and health researchers require 
health data to perform accurate, beneficial studies, and shape effective in-
terventions and treatments. The exchange of electronic data can improve 
clinical outcomes, prevent fraud and abuse, and help consumers make in-
formed choices about their health care. With these benefits, however, come 
significant threats to individual privacy and civil liberties, including dis-
crimination and autonomy violations from unwarranted disclosures to 
health insurers, employers, and governmental agencies. 
Through its health information privacy rule, HHS seeks to provide a 
national standard that balances individual interests in health information 
privacy with society's interests in accomplishing various communal goals. 
The rule provides expansive, new protections for health data privacy and 
security. In many ways, it improves existing privacy protections by creating 
an equitable, even field in which information can be responsibly exchanged. 
At the same time, the rule fails to provide a sufficient floor of protection 
for the use and disclosure of all health information. Limited by congres-
sional authorization under HIPAA, HHS at times trades personal privacy 
for public (e.g., public health exception) and nonpublic goods (e.g., com-
mercial marketing exception). Reaching a final balance between individual 
and communal uses of health data may require additional authorization 
from Congress, or, alternatively, new federal legislation. For now, the regu-
lation represents a new standard in an age of increasing threats to individual 
interests in protecting the privacy of their health data. 
171. [d. § 16~.514(e)(3)(ii)(A)-(B) 
